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F irst, EU law indicates that Brexit does not require one but two different agreements between the UK and the EU: one that 
defines the terms of the separation, 
and one that builds a new ‘relationship’ 
between the EU and the UK. While 
these agreements will probably be 
negotiated simultaneously, they are 
governed by different legal rules. 
Second, EU law suggests that while 
the separation agreement is limited 
substantively, and can be passed with 
a qualified majority of Member States 
agreeing; any new deal between the 
EU and the UK will be dependent on 
the agreement of all Member States, 
and all national parliaments. This makes 
the negotiation of a new deal a political 
minefield. 
Separation settlement 
Article 50 TEU sets out the procedure 
for a Member State’s withdrawal 
from the EU. It does not, contrary to 
most suggestions by politicians and 
the media, set out the procedure or 
conditions for a ‘new deal’ between 
the UK and the EU. The conditions 
set out by Article 50 TEU relate to the 
conditions under which the UK will leave 
the EU. This separation agreement will 
cover the outstanding rights, obligations 
and liabilities that the two parties have 
vis-à-vis each other. These include, 
for example, the UK’s liabilities for EU 
infrastructure, the capital invested in 
the European Investment Bank, or the 
pension costs for UK nationals that 
(have) worked for the EU institutions. 
More detailed studies indicate that this 
‘Brexit Bill’ could amount to a maximum 
of €60bn. At the same time, the UK’s 
share of the EU’s assets is thought to 
amount to €20bn. Crucially, the final 
amount of the Brexit Bill is likely to 
reflect the strength of the parties’ 
negotiat ion posit ion rather than 
an accountant’s view of the precise 
liabilities and assets. 
A second cruc ia l  e lement to be 
discussed in the separation agreement is 
the acquired rights of EU citizens in the 
UK; and of the UK’s citizens residing in 
the EU. These discussions will touch on 
a range of rights: the rights of residence 
for workers, the rights of residence for 
economically inactive residents, such as 
family members of workers, children, 
pensioners or (temporarily) unemployed 
c it izens;  but a lso their  r ights to 
continuous access to welfare benefits. 
These questions appear to be central for 
both the EU and the UK – both of which 
have indicated their desire to settle the 
rights of residents as soon as possible. 
At the same time, any agreement will 
probably require a blanket decision 
of the rights of EU/UK migrants: it 
appears impossible to agree on, and 
administer, a model that differentiates 
in the continuous right to residence 
based on length of residence, economic 
activity, or degree of integration of the 
migrant in the host state. The most 
likely outcome, at this point, would be a 
guaranteed right to residence for all UK/
EU citizens who were lawfully resident 
in the EU/UK on the 23th of June 2016. 
This might be seen as a defeat for the 
UK’s government (given that one of 
the promises made in the aftermath of 
Brexit was to decrease migration from 
the EU, and not to create a scheme of 
indefinite residence for EU nationals 
that is more generous than under EU 
law itself), but will be relatively easy to 
administer. The more complex question 
is the extent to which these groups 
of already resident migrants retain 
their right to equal access to welfare 
benefits in the host state. This appears 
a particularly salient point for the UK 
pensioners in Spain and Portugal, and is 
a question in which the UK government 
might soon find itself between a rock 
and a hard place. On the one hand, it 
has read the Brexit mandate to mean to 
decrease immigration and be tougher 
on welfare payouts to migrants. On 
the other hand, however, the only 
administratively feasible solution may 
be to grant full equal treatment to 
those migrants that have obtained 
indefinite leave to remain. Either way, 
expect much political contestation and 
litigation. 
No doubt other outstanding rights, 
obligations, and liabil ities will be 
discussed in the upcoming months 
within the context of this separation 
agreement. In institutional terms, 
Article 50 TEU sets out clearly that, 
from the EU side, any deal (negotiated 
by the Commission) must be signed 
off by a qualified majority in Council 
(representing 55% of Member States 
and 65% of EU citizens), after having 
obtained the consent of the European 
Parliament. Even if the substance and 
procedure in this settlement agreement 
are complex, it can be expected that the 
EU and the UK agree on a deal before 
the two-year period specified in Article 
50 TEU expires. 
A ‘New Deal’ between 
the UK and the EU
The ‘bold and ambitious’ new free 
trade deal that Theresa May wants to 
agree with the EU will not be agreed 
within the context of the separation 
agreement, even if they might be 
negotiated simultaneously. The new 
deal will be an international agreement 
conducted between the EU and a third 
state – not dissimilar to the deals that 
the EU has with Switzerland, Singapore, 
or Canada. The importance of reaching 
a new deal with the EU by the March 
2019 is evident: by that date all existing 
agreements based on the EU treaties 
will expire, and all rights and obligations 
between the parties will expire. This 
is the ‘cliff edge’ that the UK is so 
concerned about. If we look at the legal 
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rules setting out the procedure for this 
new deal, however, we quickly realize 
that it will be incredibly hard to find an 
agreement within two years. 
First, the rules on who gets to vote on 
the new deal on the EU’s side need 
to be clarified. Theresa May’s Brexit 
speech (and the White Paper) set 
out a number of areas in which she 
wants to come to agreement with 
the EU: maintain an open border 
b e t w e e n  I re l a n d  a n d  N o r t h e r n 
Ireland, a comprehensive trade deal 
between the UK and the EU, access 
for financial services to the EU’s single 
market, cooperation in European 
Research Council, European Space 
Agency and the combat of crime and 
terrorism. The problem with this is 
that some of these areas fall within 
the competences that the EU shares 
with its Member States, making it a 
so-called ‘mixed agreement’, which, in 
turn, requires all Member States and 
all national parliaments (in addition to 
the European Parliament) to sign off 
on it. As we have recently seen in the 
ratification of the free trade agreement 
with Canada, this means that every 
Member  State  (or even some 
regional parliaments) effectively 
has a veto over the agreement. This 
is even without considering that any 
new deal may require a referendum in 
Member States, such as the Netherlands 
or Ireland, which allow for the possibility 
to call referendums on the ratification 
of international agreements. Rather 
than negotiating a ‘new deal’ with the 
Commission, then, the UK will indirectly 
be negotiating with 28 (if not more) 
veto players. 
Th i s  r a i se s  a  second  po in t  tha t 
complicates negotiations on a new deal 
between the UK and the EU. A good 
example of this is a recent letter 
sent by Lodewijk Asscher, the 
leader of the Dutch centre-left party, 
sent to all centre-left leaders across 
the EU. In it, he suggests that Member 
States should not agree on any deal 
with the UK that does not come with 
strict tax avoidance rules for the future, 
which May and Hammond have 
threatened to do. The point is not 
that Lodewijk Asscher, who is unlike 
to remain in power throughout the 
Brexit process, will block any new deal 
between the UK and the EU. The point 
is that the voting rules for any new deal 
allow for individual Member States 
to make very specific and particular 
demands on the UK, which it may have 
to accept in order to secure its desired 
new deal with the EU. Those Member 
State demands may not even have 
anything to do with Brexit. It is perhaps 
not plausible, but completely possible, 
that Tsipras demands debt relief before 
signing an agreement, or that France 
demands that the UK house a number 
of refugees, Belgium pushes for the 
imposition of fishing quotas on the UK 
even after Brexit, and so on. To put it 
as simple as possible: any new deal will 
come with significant commitments 
and limitations to the UK’s sovereign 
autonomy; and the UK is ill-placed to 
resist such demands given the rule that 
requires unanimous ratification by all 
Member States and their parliaments 
before any new deal enters into force. 
A third point that requires our attention 
is the way in which any new deal will be 
institutionalized and enforced. The UK 
government, in its White Paper, paid 
close attention to different models and 
mechanism of dispute resolution. The 
explicit objective is to prevent any legal 
force emanating from Luxembourg, 
and to prevent the European Court of 
Justice from imposing its rulings on the 
UK. This creates a serious legal problem. 
In a number of opinions, the European 
Court of Justice has invalidated the 
EU’s participation to international 
agreements that affect the European 
Court of Justice’s monopoly on the 
final interpretation of EU law rules. To 
put it simply, allowing any institution 
other than the European Court of 
Justice to interpret EU law rules without 
supervision from Luxembourg is illegal 
under EU law. This means, for the Brexit 
discussion, that new dispute resolution 
bodies may be created to govern new 
policy agreements between the UK 
and the EU, but not to govern the 
ones that already exist under EU law, 
such as far-reaching commitments 
in police and terrorism cooperation, 
rules on the external borders of the EU 
(such as in Ireland), rules on financial 
services and the rules governing access 
to, and conditions of competition on, 
the internal market. This creates a 
significant legal problem for the UK’s 
desire to sideline the European Court 
of Justice, which cannot even be 
circumvented with agreement of the 
Commission, European Parliament, and 
27 Member States and their national 
parliaments. 
The rules on voting for a new ‘bold and 
ambitious’ trade deal between the UK 
and the EU indicate that the power 
very much lies in the camp of the EU. 
These negotiations take place with a 
cliff-edge of March 2019 lurking in the 
background, and pit the UK against 
(at least) 28 veto players, all of which 
have different and possibly incompatible 
interests in the process of negotiation. It 
appears all but impossible to negotiate 
a meaningful deal within the two years 
set out for its agreement. 
Conclusion
Now that Article 50 TEU has been 
triggered by the UK government, the 
attention shifts to the conditions under 
which the separation agreement and 
the new trade deal governing the 
relationship between the UK and the 
EU will be negotiated. Before even 
looking at the substantive decisions 
that need to be made, it is clear that the 
legal rules that govern the agreement 
between the EU and a third state make 
the position of the UK very complicated. 
All Member States and their national (or 
even regional) parliaments have a veto 
over the new deal, in addition to the 
European Parliament, which will require 
the UK to be sensitive to very disparate 
and far-reaching demands from its 
European partners.
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